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Introduction
Buildings account for 40% of global energy consumption and nearly 
one-third of global CO2 emissions Levine et al. [1]. New buildings that 
are energy-inefficient are being built every day, and millions of today’s 
inefficient buildings will remain standing in 2050 [2]. Moreover, the 
energy usage of buildings is growing rapidly as more people move 
into modern homes and acquire amenities such as heating, cooling, 
and refrigeration. Large and attractive opportunities exist to reduce 
buildings’ energy use at lower costs and higher returns than in other 
sectors. Compared to developed economies, developing countries 
in general lack the incentive and technical knowhow to pursue 
sustainability [3]. There is an urgent call for the developing countries to 
raise their awareness and contribute their efforts on BEE development 
so as to combat the climate change and address the environmental 
concerns [4]. 
Up to 50% of all energy is consumed by buildings, including the 
development of materials, construction, and operation. In Hong 
Kong, for example, buildings consume over half of all energy and 
about 89% of electricity, mainly for air-conditioning, which is the 
source of roughly 17% of all Hong Kong’s greenhouse gas emissions 
[5-7]. In practice, improving BEE is complicated due to the many 
parties and factors involved: the government, the market, the end-
users, many practitioners, a range of technologies,, and a variety of 
cultures. It would be helpful for governments to know how to oversee 
BEE development most efficiently. BEE studies, though complicated, 
are necessary for improving energy efficiency and must involve more 
than just improving technology. Reports [2,8] show that with currently 
available technology, the energy-efficiency level could be increased by 
40%, yet this does not happen. There must be some underlying reasons 
that call for the attention and collaboration among the key players 
of governing institutions, based on multi-disciplinary studies that 
consider economics, politics, society, technology, and so forth. 
Economic theories suggest that market structure and performance 
is determined by the ease of entry to and exit from a market [9]. 
Chiang found that the institutional environment in Hong Kong led to 
the market concentration of the construction industry [10]. Building 
contractors compete intensely over cost reductions rather than 
technology improvements. According to the Hong Kong Consumer 
Council’s study, the local property development market was also 
highly concentrated [11]. It is still true that only the large developers 
with superior financial resources can remain active in the sector. Under 
such market situations, the key market players have little incentive 
to venture into the new business of green building. Compared with 
conventional building, the entry barrier to the BEE market is higher 
because of the new information, expertise, new technology, and 
financial risk involved. If there is asymmetric information about 
quality standards or mandatory requirements that are not imposed 
on the market, the opportunistic behavior of most market players may 
make them continue to produce conventional buildings [12].
From the new institutional economics perspective, when 
Transaction Costs (TCs) are too large, they inhibit exchange, 
production, and economic growth. The functioning of TCs under 
alternative institutional arrangements is also crucial to the workings 
of markets [13-17]. From the transaction cost economics, energy 
efficiency is a coordination and incentive problem rather than one 
of utility maximization [18]. This view also emphasizes that policy 
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estate representatives and architects, using a case of Hong Kong, where real estate developers are chosen to be 
the study object as they are the initiative and dominate force. The study focuses on how to smooth BEE transactions 
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interventions and different institutional structures may lower TCs and 
provide net social benefits [8,18,19]. The situation calls for a thorough 
study focusing on how to smooth transactions for market stakeholders 
in energy-efficient development, with the aim of lessening the TCs 
involved in BEE transactions.
Figure 1 illustrates the key issues of this research for which a critical 
review of the literature is provided to develop a clear understanding of 
how they relate to one another. The consolidated issues are summarized 
to help develop the research questions and propositions. 
This research mainly focuses on how to smooth transactions 
among the market stakeholders in energy efficiency development in 
order to realize the energy-saving target. The study does not focus 
on any particular type of building technology, but rather on how to 
marketize energy-efficient residential buildings to be more acceptable 
to market stakeholders. It is to lessen the TCs due to the barriers to BEE 
and to propose policy packages accordingly. Its intention is to identify 
key areas where policy initiatives can help address the market’s needs 
for BEE with follow-up empirical study.
Literature Review 
TCs approach 
“Without the concept of transaction costs, which is largely absent 
from current economic theory, it is my contention that it is impossible 
to understand the working of the economic system, to analyze many of 
its problems in a useful way, or to have a basis for determining policy” [20].
Transaction costs, in Coase’s original formulation, refer to “the 
cost of using the price mechanism” or “the cost of carrying out a 
transaction by means of an exchange on the open market” [21,22]. 
In Demsetz’s study, “TCs may be defined as the cost of exchanging 
ownership titles” [23]. Gordon consolidated definition of TCs as the 
expense of organizing and participating in a market or implementing a 
government policy is the definition used in this study [24]. A number 
of transaction-cost issues arise with respect to the development and 
implementation of BEE incentive schemes. Adapting this definition is 
in line with the work of other authors who treat TCs and administrative 
costs as essentially interchangeable terms [25]. As Coase explains, “In 
order to carry out a market transaction, it is necessary to discover who 
it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes 
to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a 
bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed 
to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so 
on” [22]. Thus, there is reason to consider changing institutions, formal 
and informal rules and their enforcement arrangements, to the extent 
that these influence the nature of transactions and thus their costs.
Transaction cost economics (TCE) argues that markets and 
organizations provide alternative means of organizing economic 
activities and that the choice between them depends upon a number 
of factors, including the relative magnitude of TCs [26,27]. In common 
with orthodox economic theory, TCE explains the behavior of 
individuals rather than social structures and assumes these individuals 
to be rational actors in that they seek out opportunities to improve 
economic efficiency. This research applies TCE to study the underlying 
reasons why the market is reluctant to accept BEE by choice. The 
findings help establish the study’s discussion on how to choose a 
particular governance structure to solve the existing problem.
In empirical studies, a direct measurement of TCs is simply the 
economic value of resources used in locating trading partners and 
executing transactions. Another common measurement of TCs is the 
difference between the prices paid by the buyers and received by the 
sellers. Some studies focus more on secondary costs than on direct costs 
per se. For example, Williamson Ian TCE is primarily interested in the 
secondary costs of negotiation and enforcement. Some are concerned 
with the cost of government regulations imposed on market entry and 
transactions, which either reduces the size of the market or eliminates 
the market altogether. In this study, the key TCA independent variables 
for measuring the preference of developers’ for BEE investment are asset 
specificity (or specific investment), uncertainty (economic, market and 
policy uncertainty), and frequency. Asset specificity refers to durable 
investments that are undertaken in support of particular transactions. 
These specific investments represent sunk costs that have a much lower 
value outside of these particular transactions [27]. Uncertainty refers 
to three aspects: economic uncertainty, market uncertainty and policy 
uncertainty. Frequency refers to how often the buyers make purchases 
in the market [27]. Figure 2 is a TCA Model developed for this study to 
help understand developers’ preferences for BEE investment with the 
consideration of TCs. Three measurement indicators for TCs items in 
this study are money, time, and worry. Propositions will be developed, 
and a set of interviews will be conducted with real estate developers and 
their representatives to determine the importance of TCs. 
BEE and its barriers 
With socioeconomic progress, more market stakeholders are 
getting involved in the building sector and are dedicated to their own 
business interests. Real estate developers intend to do no more than 
Figure 1: Five key research subjects and their interrelations. 
Figure 2:  TCA model for real estate developers’ preference on BEE 
investment (by the authors).
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obey the basic requirements of the law and regulatory policies to 
minimize the increasing costs engendered by the extra work entailed 
by mandatory energy regulations. Contractors also want to avoid 
these extra tasks, because they require special expertise and specialized 
equipment that they do not typically possess. Manufacturers of BEE 
products want regulations to be still stricter to create greater demand. 
Building-design institutes will not be greatly influenced by the new 
policies but are apt to succumb to the demands of developers because 
of the nature of their relationship with them. However, these interests 
have not yet been fully expressed by the stakeholders themselves. These 
conflicting interests are the main source of the risks of and barriers to 
BEE development. 
The number of barriers is enormous – according to some estimates, 
they are higher in the building sector than in any other sectors [8,28]. 
In this context, a barrier refers to a mechanism that inhibits decisions 
or behavior that appear to be both energy and economic efficient. 
In particular, barriers are claimed to prevent investment in cost-
effective energy-efficient technologies [29]. The terms “barrier” and 
“market barrier” were introduced by researchers using engineering-
economic models to study the technical and economic potential for 
energy efficiency. Often little interest in investments with high rates 
of return led to postulate that such BEE investments were inhibited by 
various barriers. This study has developed a framework for analyzing 
BEE barriers and TCs incurred based on earlier work [29,30-32]. The 
interview questions for the empirical study are designed based on this 
literature review framework (Figure 3).
Barriers relating to the BEE market (Developers and End-
Users) and government’s role
This study focuses on two main market players involved with 
energy efficient buildings – the real estate developers and the end-users, 
who are at the two ends of the delivery of energy-efficient buildings. 
It makes sense to believe that these two players are so interrelated in 
the market that any concerns that hinder them from investing in BEE 
will eventually keep the transaction from happening. Therefore, this 
part of the analysis is to determine how their interactions affect their 
willingness to invest. 
Promoting BEE requires that government and all parties in 
the market work together. By and large, the government agencies 
concerned with energy efficiency end up confining themselves to 
providing publicity and information. The government needs to play the 
role of a moderator to make it convenient for the market to embrace 
BEE. The growth of the BEE market requires a politically friendly 
environment with the appropriate combination of government 
intervention and flexibility; it also needs a well-designed institutional 
structure to encourage investment and change the business culture. 
The government’s role is mainly to set out a good foundation (the well-
organized institution) and a clear domain (clear of constraints, but also 
some flexibility) for the BEE market stakeholders. 
The hypotheses and the interview questions from BEE 
barriers- an overview
Design of the interview question was based on the discussions on 
BEE barriers, to address three major theoretical dimensions of TCs: 
specific investment, frequency, and uncertainty. Seven hypotheses 
regarding these three aspects were developed, and related open 
questions about the interviewees’ opinions were designed to test each of 
them (Table 1). Table 1 summarizes the barriers discussed in literature 
that the authors take reference to develop the hypotheses for empirical 
study. The hypotheses and the interview questions were developed 
based on the literature review and pilot interview with a few experts 
in industry and academia. The relations between the three dimensions, 
Figure 3: Literature review Framework for BEE market barriers.
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Barriers Common Claims TCs considerations of BEE- developed to Hypotheses 
Risk aversion
• BEE investment represents a higher technical or financial risk. The business & market 
uncertainty encourages short time capital return.
• To replace familiar technologies and partnerships with new but more efficient ones is 
difficult due to risks, including economic fluctuations, policy instability, possible delay, 
and litigation, which should average out across the entire society and yield a positive 
economic return. 
Specific investment:
H1: Dividing the transactions of the real estate 
development process into smaller established stages 
helps government to better understand the process and 
make policies with a more focused emphasis on the 
different stages of transaction to promote BEE more 
efficiently.
Frequency:
H2: There is a positive relationship between the size of 
the company and the TCs in BEE projects.
H3: There is a positive relationship between the 
frequency of BEE investments and the TCs incurred in 
developing BEE projects.
Uncertainty- economic 
H4: The economic context (upturn or downturn 
economic transition) affects the concerns of the real 
estate developers about BEE investment.
H5: Changes in economic conditions call for the 
attention of government to adjust BEE policies as 
necessary to seize BEE development opportunities.
Hidden costs and 
benefit
•  BEE potential may be overestimated by failing to account for the reduction in utility 
associated with BEE technologies and other additional costs.
•  The hidden costs and benefits are not captured directly in financial flows, including 
costs associated with securing the energy efficient solution and risks associated with 
the replacement technology. 
•  TCs are often high due to the fragmented structure of the building sector with its many 
small owners and agents. 
•  New technologies may not be compatible with existing sockets. 
•  The indirect benefits of improved energy efficiency, such as reduced air pollution and 
improved health, are often ignored.
Imperfect information 
•  Lack of information about the possibilities and techniques for and potential of energy- 
efficient solutions is a major barrier, especially in developing countries.  
•  TCs of information acquisition may be high due to quality and credibility.
Negative externality 
•  Non-BEE buildings consume more energy and release more carbon emissions, 
which are the negative externalities and need to be taken into account and be fairly 
apportioned to keep the end-users and developers from losing the motivation to further 
invest in BEE. 
Access to capital 
•  BEE investments may be avoided if market stakeholders have insufficient capital 
through internal funds, and has difficulty in raising additional funds, due to internal 
capital budgeting procedures, investment appraisal rules and the short-term/instable 
incentives. 
•  Higher capital costs raise the uncertainty and opportunity costs to the stakeholders, 
especially if the investment is financed by a mortgage or other loan. Besides, BEE 
investment would normally require a longer payback period, which increases business risk. 
Public goods 
•  BEE would prevent society from consuming extra energy and releasing unnecessary 
pollution, and have a collective effect society as a whole would benefit from, and many 
would benefit as free riders. BEE itself creates a lack of interest in itself as a business 
initiative. 
•  The availability of BEE information is also a public good. The public requires a large flow 
of extra information to have confidence in breaking its routine to invest in BEE. Market 
stakeholders need to have public and transparent information about technology. 
Bounded
•  Owing to constraints on time, cost, and the ability to process information, imitated 
knowledge of the stakeholders on BEE investment, they either have an irrationally high 
expectation for the BEE investment
Uncertainty- market 
H6: The end-users’ variable expectations about BEE 
increase market uncertainty to the developers (e.g.., 
they may misinterpret a focused group as the end-users 
of their final products).
rationality
•  Return and/or payback period or more interested in pursuing other short-term 
alternatives or to neglect the small cost savings from the energy efficiency improvement.
•  Changing behavior or lifestyles is very difficult. A lack of awareness and information 
about the opportunities and low costs of energy savings are a related problem. Energy 
subsidies are considered to be one of the most important BEE barriers in developing 
countries.
Split incentives 
•  The cost and benefit of BEE is bear by different parties and difficult to appropriate 
among the investors. 
•  The developers are reluctant to invest unless someone is going to pay for it. Similarly, 
utilities have no direct interest in measures for reducing their clients’ energy use. 
Regulatory distortions
•  The regulatory structure can create perverse incentives in form of regulatory bias, 
under-priced energy, building codes, and subsidies to established energy technologies. 
The building codes are not updated in a timely fashion, which inhibits technology 
innovation and interferes with efficient construction; inconsistency confuses the market 
and creates obstacles to achieve economies-of-scale for BEE.
Uncertainty- policy
H7: The earlier the stage of BEE policy implementation, 
the greater the real estate developers’ concern about 
TCs.Political and 
Organizational 
barriers
•  A lack of government involvement in promoting BEE due to inadequate enforcement 
structures and institutions; inappropriate government intervention that distorts business 
activities; the inflexibility of local governments; an insufficient number of qualified 
personnel; the lack of a long-term energy conservation mechanism; a lack of credible 
third-party agencies; the slow pace of institutional reform; worries about social stability; 
policies or programs that are incompatible with one another; resistance from interested 
parties; legal & urban-planning constraints; weak investment culture; weak managerial 
supervision of manpower & organization; problems with multi-institutional collaboration 
& coordination; local governments’ resistance to change; and corruption.
Simon [36] , Stern and Aronson [37], Koomey [31], Golove and Eto [19], Alam [38], Deringer [39], Shove [40], Wrestling [41], Evander [42], Sorrell [29], Chappells and Shove 
[43], Carbon Trust [44], Vine [45], Koeppel [8]. 
Table 1: Barriers to BEE and their TCs considerations to develop the hypotheses for empirical interviews.
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seven hypotheses (H), and fifteen interview questions (Q) are listed in 
Tables 2-4 below. The Remarks explain how the interview questions 
relate to the hypotheses. 
Design of the Interview Questions from the Hypotheses- 
In Details 
Questions for Specific Investment
Specific investment in BEE increases the workloads of developers 
and the resources they need, which increases their concerns as they 
decide whether to make a BEE investment. 
Hypothesis (H1) proposes that in securing a detailed understanding 
of the BEE elements, such as technologies, appliances, or inputs 
for specific investments, it is better to break down the real estate 
development process, by the difficulty of retrofits (Q2), by the type of 
buildings (luxury or low-price), (Q3). The purpose of these questions is 
to determine whether the policies can be designed for a highly specific 
group with effective incentives for securing investments in BEE.
Q1 is to elicit the underlying reasons and the approximate limit (as 
percentage of the development budget) that the developers would be 
willing to invest in BEE without incentives from the government. The 
purpose is to see if the government could create a business environment 
conducive to BEE with any market interventions. Q4 addresses one of 
the most notorious features of BEE – misplaced interests – in order to 
understand how they affect the current situation, determine what about 
them concerns developers, and determine what, if any, resolution is 
called for by the market. These five interview questions collectively 
address, from different perspectives, the issues raised by Hypothesis 
H1. The open question format allows the interviewees to talk freely 
about their concerns in a wider context.
Questions for frequency of BEE investment
The frequency of BEE transactions is another dimension that 
affects TCs. How frequently the developers invest in BEE may affect 
their concerns differently. The TCs may thus change accordingly (H3). 
Q7 and Q8 are the two questions that address the relationship 
between the level of concerns about BEE investment and the frequency 
of BEE transactions. The nature of this relationship may help 
governments design different policies to encourage investment by 
frequent and occasional investors by taking into account their different 
concerns. 
The size of the company and the size of the project also affect 
investors’ capacity to invest and, therefore, the frequency with which 
they do so (H2). Big companies may have different concerns and 
strategies than smaller ones when it comes to BEE investments (Q6). 
To integrate green features into bigger projects may have different 
impacts in terms of TCs, compared to smaller ones (Q5). 
To understand how changing concerns are a function of the size 
of the RED company or project and the frequency of BEE investment 
requires knowing market segmentation according to both size and 
frequency. This information allows government to design and specify 
incentives for more focused groups. 
Questions for uncertainty
Uncertainty about BEE investments is one of the general features of 
TCs that causes real estate developers worry. Uncertainty is examined 
in this study from three perspectives: economic uncertainty, market 
uncertainty, and policy uncertainty. 
What is the impact of economic transition on the BEE development 
(to the developer – H4; to the government – H5)? Is it a challenge or an 
opportunity? How do the developers’ concerns change in an economic 
Q1 What are the reasons that make developers willing to invest in new BEE technology without government incentives? What price difference (% of development cost) would be acceptable?
Q2 Uneven emphasis on incentives: What facilities/building elements are more expensive/difficult to be retrofitted, if not installed in the first place? Should they be emphasized in incentives to promote BEE investment? 
Q3 For developers investing in BEE, what are the different concerns of investing in luxury buildings and in lower-priced buildings? Why?
Q4 There is misplaced benefit between the people who pay and who gain from BEE. To address this problem, would rental/selling-price differences help?
Table 2: Specific Investment – relating to H1.
Q5 Will the size of the project affect the developers’ concerns about BEE investment?
Q6 Will the size of the RED company affect the developers’ concern about BEE investment?
Q7 How does the frequency (e.g., regular, occasional, or at one-time) of developers’ BEE investments affect their concerns about BEE investment?
Q8 Would the developers’ concerns change if they invested in BEE projects more frequently? Why?
Table 3: Frequency: relating to H2-H3.
Economic uncertainty
Q9 At times of economic transition, what new challenges or opportunities arise for investments in BEE? How do shifts in the economy change the developers’ major concerns (neutral, positive, or negative) and in which aspects?  
Q10 When the direction of the economy shifts, how might developers integrate green features into original investments to increase market competitiveness?
Q11 What role should government play in BEE promotion (more intervention or less intervention in a recessionary economy)? 
Q12 What BEE promotions or incentive could government introduce in times of economic change that would be less upsetting to the market players’ normal activities?
Market uncertainty
Q13 Occupants’ behavioral differences may lead developers to produce different BEE/GB at different performance levels. What is your view?
Q14 Will concerns about social classes (different education levels, experiences, financial ability to enjoy the benefits of BEE) affect the developers’ concern about BEE investment?
Policy uncertainty
Q15 Would a new incentive and a currently mature incentive affect the developers’ concerns about BEE differently? In other words, encountering BEE incentives, would the developers have more concerns during the early or later stage of the implementation of the incentive? How are they different?
Table 4: Uncertainty: relating to H4-H7.
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downturn or upturn? What should government be alert to during such 
periods and how can it develop the most effective policies to promote 
BEE accordingly? These are the main issues that are addressed in 
interview questions Q9- Q12.
The market also creates many uncertainties for developers. They may 
be hesitant to invest in BEE due to a lack of confidence in estimations of 
market demand. The end-users’ expectations and concerns about BEE 
may be better known, so that both the developers and the government 
could seize the opportunity to promote BEE. This brings H6 onto the 
horizon. Q13 and Q14 are designed to detail the behavior and concerns 
of the market end-users about BEE by segmenting the customers so 
that the real estate developers might have a more confident business 
strategy and so that the government can design its incentive policies to 
cater to more focused groups based on a better understanding of the 
needs and concerns of both end-users and developers.
Policy also affects uncertainty during different implementation 
stages. This uncertainty affects the worries and enthusiasm of the market 
variously, thus affecting the effectiveness of the policies themselves. The 
policy uncertainty is based on the assumption that the timing of the 
policy’s introduction is a major factor in causing uncertainty for the 
real estate developers (H7). Q15 is designed to elicit information about 
how the stage at which the policy is implemented affects the real estate 
developer’s concerns, which gives government information that lets 
it have market concerns in mind as it implements policy at different 
points in the process.
Discussions on the Role and the Partnership of 
Government and Business in Promoting BEE
As an authority to set up institutions and design policies, 
government is more able to improve its own efficiency and internal 
decision-making than to improve its external counterpart, the market. 
Government should adopt a clear national policy to improve energy 
efficiency through a coherent package of policy measures. Policy 
mechanisms alone will not work and market forces by themselves will 
not achieve the potential for energy efficiency. Because the spread of 
energy efficiency improvements cannot be left to the market, there has 
to be an emphasis on policy-assisted, market-oriented mechanisms for 
promoting energy efficiency. 
To determine the most needed policies to improve BEE in 
a particular society requires an in-depth understanding of the 
expectations of the market and government. Most policymakers regard 
energy efficiency principally as an environmental or social issue, rather 
than an economic one. Hence, policies are designed with inadequate 
consideration of the needs of market stakeholders and not pay enough 
attention to the necessity that businesses accept them. Government 
tends to pay more attention to the environmental consequences of 
energy consumption, and business enterprises may care more about 
their technical and financial ability to make changes, their potential 
economic benefits, and so forth. Detailed negotiation and greater 
understanding between government and the market stakeholders is 
needed to reach a win-win outcome. 
Only when both the end-users and the developers appreciate 
the benefits of energy efficiency building will they create a business 
channel for BEE products and the BEE market. Each of the barriers 
discussed above provides an opportunity for policies to address, but it 
will involve simple matches of one policy to one barrier. It will require 
a careful selection and combination of a set of policy instruments to 
overcome these existing barriers. How, then, do we choose among so 
many policy instruments? Economic theory, along with careful analysis 
of BEE barriers, provides guidance for matching policies to barriers. 
Follow-Up Studies: Empirical Research on BEE to Be 
Conducted In Hong Kong
Why is Hong Kong chosen as a case study?
Hong Kong is a suitable choice for this study, as it is economically 
well-developed regions with free markets and fairly educated 
professionals for green building and energy efficiency. The GDP per 
capita at current market prices in 2007 in Hong Kong was U.S. $41,110 
(IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, 2007). Construction as a 
share of total GDP has been in the range of 5-7% in Hong Kong in 
recent years [33]. Harnessing solar energy through solar cells, sun-
shading devices, low-emissivity glass, energy-efficient air-conditioning 
systems, and building-space planning and orientation are common 
design considerations for BEE in Hong Kong. Hong Kong relies 
more on voluntary effort, and there are several green groups, such 
as the Professional Green Building Council and the Green Council, 
promoting the voluntary use of BEE. The HK-BEAM and other green-
label programs are accepted assessment tools promulgated by voluntary 
bodies in the past decade. In recent years, the Hong Kong government 
has begun to take an active part in driving BEE initiatives [34,35].
Why in-depth interview the real estate developers?
In-depth interviews were conducted with the executives and 
architects who work in big real estate development firms in Hong 
Kong to solicit their views on issues regarding BEE investment. The 
interviewees to be selected are top managers or directors from the top 6 
real estate development companies, who actively worked in major real 
estate development firms or architectural firms, which covered 80% 
of real estate activities in Hong Kong. As the decision-makings and 
strategic plans for the real estate development- whether BEE or not, 
and market expectations/ concerns to BEE, are only done by people 
who are senior and stay high position. 
The interviews to the high profile practitioners will reflect their 
preference to current BEE development in practice, which directly 
and indirectly reflect their will if and how to achieve the BEE 
decision-makings, and have a very heavy weight to influence the 
other stakeholders in the BEE market and overall BEE promotions. 
Therefore, the findings of the interviews are to get the perspectives of 
real estate developers and to check the assumptions and findings about 
BEE market barriers in the literature review. It is to hope to provide a 
reference for designing rational policy. 
Conclusions 
This study develops a methodology framework of the TC theories 
to be tested in the real world interviews in an empirical study of Hong 
Kong. This study has adopted a holistic approach to studying the 
barriers to BEE investments and has focused on TCs in particular. It 
provides a review of diverse literatures, including those on building 
energy efficiency, TCs, and real estate development. This research has 
comprehensively analyzed the market barriers to BEE and TCs incurred 
from the perspectives of the developers. The overall methodology 
framework is theoretically significant with the original data from a case 
study in Hong Kong to bring a thorough understanding of BEE market. 
The results will definitely help understand the real market concerns in 
terms of TCs regarding BEE development. It helps the policy makers 
to understand when, to whom, where, and how to design the policies 
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that are in favor to the real need of the market. It, therefore, ensures the 
success of BEE implementation.
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